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1. INTRODUCTION
Events related to the conduct of the judiciary in Pennsylvania
over the past twelve months have put in stark relief the issues
that surround concepts of judicial independence and judicial ac-
countability.
Two judges in Luzerne County in the northeastern corner of the
state stand accused of abusing their judicial office for financial
gain.' In and of itself, an accusation that a judge has been cor-
* Clifford E. Haines is the immediate past president of the Pennsylvania Bar Associ-
ation. He has also served as the Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association (1997). He
is the president of Haines & Associates, a boutique litigation practice in Philadelphia. He
is Director of the Temple University Academy of Advocacy and teaches trial practice for the
National Institute for Trial Advocacy. He serves on the state Council for the Arts, the
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority, and is an active ABA member. He is a fellow of the
American College of Trial Advocacy and the International Academy of Trial Lawyers.
1. United States v. Conahan, No. 3:09-CR-028, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2009).
The events in Luzerne County first came to light when it was announced that the Judges
were entering provisional guilty pleas to federal charges of Theft of Honesty Services and
had agreed to a prison sentence. When it came time for the Court to accept those pleas it
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rupted by money is unfortunately neither unique nor stunning.
Whether it is the temptations that accompany power, the fact that
judges are underpaid compared to their counterparts practicing
law, drugs, alcohol, gambling, or flat out dishonesty, judges all too
often violate their oath of office and become corrupt. What make
the accusations against the Luzerne County judges raise such se-
rious questions about the independence of the judiciary are the
facts of the case. It is not simply that judges took money. As ac-
cused, the judges are alleged to have committed juvenile offenders
to a private juvenile detention center in return for money from the
owner of the facility. 2 In some instances the "crimes" the juveniles
committed were nothing more than innocent pranks. In one in-
stance a young girl who had never been in trouble before and who
was a "stellar" student, had mocked an assistant principal in her
high school. Her crime consisted of creating a spoof MySpace page
which said at the bottom it was a joke. Her offense got her a three
month sentence to imprisonment. 3
The distortion of their judicial duty and judicial authority as
charged in the federal indictment is so disturbing that it almost
defies one's ability to comprehend how someone could be so cor-
rupt. Because our judicial system in Pennsylvania has given
judges so much autonomy by way of judicial independence and
because there is a public expectation that people who aspire to be
judges are honorable men and women, we instinctively assume the
events which occurred in Luzerne County could not happen.
Of course criminal conduct of any kind rarely has a direct rela-
tionship to judicial independence. The complete freedom asso-
ciated with judicial independence can lead to opportunities that
sometimes invite misconduct, but there is little discussion of a link
between independence and criminal activity. It nonetheless seems
obvious that the unchecked freedom coupled with enormous power
that judges have seem all too often to be at the heart of a variety
of levels of judicial abuse. While we expect our judiciary to be re-
sponsible, in truth it not always is.
Concomitant with Judicial freedom is Judicial accountability.
The accountability standards applicable to judges are generally
refused to do so resulting in broader and more detailed charges against them. Accordingly,
at the present time the judges, while faced with overwhelming evidence against them, are
entitled to a presumption of innocence.
2. Cortahan, No. 3:09-CR-028, slip op. at 2-10.
3. See Jan Umbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths
for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22.
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the ethical guidelines and disciplinary rules we establish for
judges. Because of a judge's autonomy and power, however, those
guidelines may not be enough. We need to find a way to ensure
judicial accountability without taking away the important aspects
of judicial independence. This article explores the grant of inde-
pendence and the value of judicial performance evaluations in ba-
lancing independence and accountability.
II. THE REACHES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is often identified as "institutional inde-
pendence" and "decisional independence."
4
There is no precise definition of judicial independence. Some ef-
forts to formulate a definition have focused on some theoretical
analysis of the terms, while others have emphasized practical as-
pects of the role of judges individually as well as the function of
the judiciary as a whole. The effort to define independence is uni-
versal and in some countries the ability of judges to command in-
dependence is paramount to the rule of the law.
5
A. Institutional Independence
Institutional independence is used generally to describe the re-
lationship between the judicial branch of government and the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of government. 6 The enactment
of laws, rules, and regulations, by either the legislature or the ex-
ecutive, is, by virtue of the independence of the judiciary, subject
to the analysis of those pronouncements by our courts. This prin-
cipal, established in Marbury v. Madison,7 has been the hallmark
of judicial independence in the United States since 1803. The
support for this definition of an independent judiciary, although
rounded in constitutional interpretation, rests largely on the wil-
lingness of society to acknowledge the importance of a court sys-
tem free from influence. Without that moral authority there is no
way to truly enforce independence. The practical aspect of institu-
tional independence does not, of course, make every judge an in-
4. Hon. Joseph A. Del Sole & William S. Stickman, IV, An Independent Judiciary:
The Role of Chief Justice Cappy, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 547, 548 (2009).
5. See, e.g., Julie Rios-Figueria, Judicial Independence: Definition, Measurement and
its Effects on Corruption (Sept. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York Universi-
ty).
6. NCSC.com, Judicial Independence Overview, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/Judicial-
officers/judicial-independence/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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dependent agent. In order for court systems to operate in an effi-
cient and productive manner there has to be some organizational
structure and authority, a hierarchy of judicial control exercised
over things courts do. In order for courts to work properly, some-
one has to decide which judge is going to handle a particular mat-
ter. Someone has to decide who is assigned to the criminal cases,
civil cases, juvenile cases, and the orphan's court. If, within a par-
ticular judicial district or jurisdictional area, one judge handles all
of these functions, someone still has to determine how cases are
going to be scheduled and who turns the heat and lights on in the
courtroom.
Article V of the Pennsylvania Constitution has created a system
where each county or judicial district elects a president judge who
oversees the operation of the judicial system and handles all of
these ministerial responsibilities." The job of a president judge
ensures that someone will make the decisions; this makes the sys-
tem work. The assignment of even the most mundane task has to
be made by someone. That means that a president judge cannot
win a popularity contest because he or she has to decide who gets
the hardest job and the worst assignments. Even the assignment
of a particular judge to a particular courtroom requires judicial
involvement. However, the assignment of a particular case to a
particular judge may profoundly affect the outcome, and the per-
son making this decision would be expected to make it free from
the influence of anyone out of their immediate control.
Whether making assignment decisions falls under the term
judicial independence or not, it has been tied to that concept and
is an example of how far we have taken the concept. Indepen-
dence being tantamount to freedom, judges have not only jealously
guarded their freedom, they are sometimes inclined to extend it as
far as possible. As will be suggested later, the relationship be-
tween independence and power has lead to questions about the
fair reach of autonomy and the legitimate expense of judicial inde-
pendence.
B. Decisional Independence
Decisional independence is the autonomy an individual judge ha
in his or her decision making process. 9 A judge's rulings have to
8. PA. CONST. art. V, § 5.
9. Thomas 1. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary,
46 VILL. L REV. 745, 759 (2001).
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be fair and balanced. The ability of a judge to decide his or her
case without political or public pressure is at the heart of the fair-
ness we seek in our justice system. It is arguable that decisional
independence is far more important than institutional indepen-
dence. It is, after all, the daily rulings handed down by our courts
that most impact the everyday lives of the public. Not only should
a judge be free of influence from others, it is particularly repug-
nant to our system that financial pressures or influence play any
part in a judge's decisions. Not only must judges refrain from ac-
cepting money, but they must also take care that they are not in-
fluenced by gifts, favors, or political contributions. The increased
role of politics in the election and appointment of judges has made
the influence of money a central concern regarding judicial inde-
pendence.
The importance of what judges do and how they do it make in-
dependence and responsibility the most important traits in those
who become judges; furthermore, these traits influences how
judges perform their job once they take the bench. In fact, we
have put so much emphasis on the independence of the judiciary
that it has become a core value to judges and lawyers alike.
At the same time, while judicial independence is staunchly sup-
ported by the legal establishment, the public's perception of the
judiciary as independent, particularly today, is tenuous at best.
Periodic challenges arise which are both troubling and surprising.
In 1996 President William Clinton, a Yale-trained lawyer, publi-
cally threatened to call for the resignation of a federal judge in
New York because the judge had ruled inadmissible certain evi-
dence in a drug case. While the White House later tried to modify
the President's statements, the disrespect for judicial indepen-
dence was palpable.10 More recently a group of citizens in North
Dakota led an initiative which would allow for public punishment
of judges whose decisions were unpopular. Under their proposal-
called J.A.I.L. 4 Judges-any judge who handed down a decision
not to their liking would be subject to indictment and prosecu-
tion.1 1
Fortunately the voters of North Dakota soundly defeated the
proposal but there still were substantial numbers of citizens who
10. Allison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at
Al.
11. Tom Barnett, Q & A on J.A.I.L. for Judges, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2006,
http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200612/articleO6.html.
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thought it was a good idea.' 2 Both of these events evidence the
lack of trust many have in the judiciary and the way it handles its
independence.
111. THE LEGAL PROFESSION HA LONG PLAYED THE PREDOMINANT
ROLE IN ADVOCATING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Lawyers everywhere have long been the champions of Judicial
independence. That effort is almost always in response to harsh
and intemperate rhetoric by others. It is sometimes a reflective
reaction, but when judges are subjected to criticism there is a fear
that judicial independence is threatened. No one likes public criti-
cism, and without the ability to respond judges invariably look to
the legal community for a defense. There is, however, a distinc-
tion between criticism of a judge because of a particular ruling and
a threat to retaliate against the judge over that ruling. Threats of
reprisals against judicial decisions are seen as troublesome inter-
ferences to the ability of a judge to decide cases independently.
That does not, of course, mean that every criticism of a judge is
unwarranted or improper.
An example of how dangerous this kind of challenge is to judi-
cial independence occurred in a 2007 Pennsylvania retention elec-
tion cycle.'8 Judges in Pennsylvania and other states, after their
initial election, undergo some sort of retention election to remain
on the bench.' 4 Instead of standing for election on a partisan bal-
lot, a judge undergoes a form of referendum election. The judge's
retention on the bench for each ten-year term after the first is de-
termined by a simple yes-or-no vote in response to the question,
"Should Judge X be retained?" The judge's name appears without
reference to political party and is placed on the ballot in a place
conspicuously different than all of the contested races.
In the 2007 election, several vocal citizens' groups initiated a
campaign to have the voters of Pennsylvania reject the retention
election of over 60 trial court judges around the state and one jus-
tice of the state Supreme Court.'5 The campaign was predicated
on a ruling upholding a judicial pay raise after the General As-
sembly revoked a bill increasing the pay of both legislators and
12. See id.
13. Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice for Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A24.
14. PA. CONST. art. V.
15. G. Terry Madonna & Michael Young, First, We Kill All the Judges, POLITICALLY




judges. The Supreme Court, while supporting the revocation of
the legislative raise, ruled that their own pay raise could not be
changed because of a Constitutional prohibition to lowering judi-
cial salary.16 The ruling generated a great deal of anger that in
turn led to a movement to retaliate against all judges up for reten-
tion. The retaliation came in the form of a state wide effort to de-
feat every judge in the Commonwealth who was running for reten-
tion that year. The effort to defeat those judges took no account of
the merits of the individual's performance during his or her pre-
vious tenure or the fact that none of the targeted judges had any-
thing to do with either passing the pay raise or the decision to rule
it could not be revoked as to them. It was an attack on the judi-
ciary as a symbol of dissatisfaction with the whole idea of a pay
raise generally. The Pennsylvania Bar Association almost imme-
diately took up the cause of the judges who were constrained by
judicial rules of conduct from defending themselves. A counter
campaign was launched asking voters to consider the merits of the
judge not the merits of the pay raise decision. Fortunately the
voters responded positively and rejected this assault of the judi-
ciary and all of the judges who were subject to retention won their
elections. The success of that campaign was viewed as a state-
ment in favor of judicial independence by both the judges and the
lawyers.
But there is a disquieting aspect to the bar's role in promoting
judicial independence. While defending the judiciary from unwar-
ranted attacks promotes better relationships between the bench
and the bar in these situations, there is little effort to actively
promote judicial accountability. It is the perception among law-
yers that judges are too sensitive to discussions about limits on
their autonomy to risk addressing judicial responsibility head on.
Too often discussions prompted by concerns that a judge has acted
inappropriately are no more than whispered complaints. Lawyers
feel that any criticism will be met with retaliation. This all too
often leads to an unbalanced discussion about the importance of
judicial independence but not about accountability. This reticence
to speak up played a part in the unfettered abuse committed by
the Luzerne County judges.
Judicial independence has a curious history in Pennsylvania.
When Pennsylvania adopted its original Constitution in1776 there
was no separation of powers or branches of government as we
16. Stilp V. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006).
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know them today.17 Judges were appointed by an executive au-
thority (the concept of a governor had not even taken hold) and
they remained under that authority's control. It was only with the
scraping of the 1776 Constitution and adoption of a new Constitu-
tion in 1790 that Pennsylvania adopted a form of government
which identified a separate branch of government.18 Whether the
decision to change was a product of the chaos of a poorly crafted
government, bad people who previously held office, or the bril-
liance of the Federal Constitution is hard to say, but clearly the
wise founding fathers of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania were
not as intent on an independent judiciary as we are today.
As a result, the grant of the independence that seems so neces-
sary to the fairness of their decisions is something grudging at
best. The stock of the judiciary seems to have waxed and waned
for the two hundred plus years since those early years of the Re-
public. Judges generally are like baseball umpires, calling balls
and strikes. Invariably, they are perceived to have it wrong by at
least one side of any dispute. Today, we see society becoming
more and more polarized; there is an even higher level of distrust
and dissatisfaction with judges who are even more often perceived
to be mistaken. People genuinely believe that judge's decisions
should reflect the public will. Our education system has been un-
able to adequately educate children about the role of the judicial
branch of government or the way it is uniquely distinct from the
other two branches. At the same time, little is said by the media
or public officials about this unique and distinct role that judges
play in the tripartite system of government. As a coequal branch
of government, many think all of the same rules apply to the judi-
cial branch that apply to every other branch of government.
Judges are thought by most people to be politicians subject to the
will of the people like every other public official.
The judiciary itself has not always put its independence in the
best light either. For much of the twentieth century Pennsylva-
nia's courts were seen as the handmaiden of coal, railroads, and
steel.' 9 Even today appellate court judges are heard to say how
important it is that they get out among the people to understand
17. PA. coNST. ch. 11 (1776).
18. PA. coNST. art. 11, § 8, art. V, § 2 (1790).
19. See, e.g., Two Rival Corporations: Reading Succumbs to Pennsylvania Influence,





what they believe and feel and too often the judiciary itself has
adopted an over inflated concept. In the last appellate court deci-
sion touching on judicial independence, the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania in Local 810 American Federation of State v.
Commonwealth20 was called upon to review a trial court decision
interpreting an order entered by an arbitrator. The dispute was
between the trial court in Philadelphia County and the employees
of the court. The court employees challenged the pay scale being
applied to them compared to the pay scale for other city workers.
The trial court ruled, after an arbitrator called for a study of pay
disparity, that no such review was permitted because it interfered
with the independence of the judicial authority to select, dis-
charge, and supervise court personnel. The Commonwealth Court
ruled that the study itself had no bearing on the question of judi-
cial authority and could therefore go forward, but emphasized that
it was doing so because the study did not effect the selection, dis-
charge, or supervision of court personnel. But to tie the selection
of employees in clerical roles to judicial independence is stretching
the expanse of its meaning to a very broad sweep evidencing an
inflated view of how independent the Judiciary views itself as be-
ing.
The events that have been unfolding in Luzerne County seem to
demonstrate both the abuse and perversion of judicial authority
cloaked in terms of judicial independence. The judges who have
been charged there did more than incarcerate children for money.
Not only did the judges overreach in their adjudicatory and sen-
tencing authority, they frequently decided cases involving juvenile
crimes without either affording or offering them the right to coun-
sel .2 1 These judges not only abused their office, they ignored the
law.
But the perversion of their decisional prerogatives was accom-
panied by the abuse of their supervisory authority too. As presi-
dent judges, which both of them were during the relevant time
periods, they ignored principals of fairness in their administrative
roles. They created a culture of autocratic authority which per-
meated the courts and other offices of county government. 22 Rela-
tives and close friends were awarded jobs irrespective of their qua-
20. Local 810 v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 479 A.2d 64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
21. Wendy N. Davis, Town Without Pity, 95 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (Sept. 2009).
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lifications. The judges never met as a group and the assignment
of matters to them was decided solely by the President Judge
without consultation with the judges themselves. The interest of
other branches of government was ignored. The existing county
juvenile facility was abruptly closed and children were transferred
to the new private jail over the objection of the county commis-
sioners. 23 The balance of power associated with a fair and impar-
tial judiciary was gone. Judicial Independence turned dictatori-
al.24
While the Luzerne County situation is outrageous in the ex-
treme, the chinks in the armor of Judicial independence are not
only evidenced there. Lawyers seem to confront judges who have
lost touch with the role they play in society all the time. Judges
forget that it is not only the rulings they hand down that affect
litigants, it is the way that is done. All too often judges become
imperious and condescending to lawyers and litigants alike. It is
a disturbing reality that is often ignore because of the fear on the
part of judges that they might be abdicating power and the fear on
the part of lawyers and litigants of the expanse of that power.
Even when there is no intent to be overreaching, the lack of ex-
planation for decisions is alarming. The holding in Local 810 it-
self suggests a misguided notion of the reaches of judicial inde-
pendence. Matters that require give and take between branches
of government fail to be satisfactorily resolved because of the de-
clared independence of the judiciary. In 1987 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ordered the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
fully fund the unified court system.25 When that order was ig-
nored, a writ of mandamus followed. 26 To this day the Common-
wealth has failed to comply with that decision. If courts draw un-
realistic parameters around their decisions, legislatures ignore the
courts and judges do, in fact, misbehave. The call for an indepen-
dent judiciary becomes hard to justify
23. AFSCME Dist. Council 87 v. Luzerne County, No. PERA-C-03-104-E (Pa. Labor
Relations B~d. Oct. 19, 2004).
24. See Andrew M. Sector, Business Ties of Judges are Questioned, TIMES LEADER, May
30, 2008, http://www.timesleader.com/news/Business-ties-ofjudges-.are-questioned_05-30-
2008.html.
25. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 534 A.2d 760, 765 (Pa.
1988).




IV. HAS JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE GONE Too FAR
Being a judge is not easy. Judges almost always deal with
people who are in difficult and unpleasant situations. Lawyers
pressure themselves to perform and are pressured to perform by
their clients. Litigants and witnesses are frightened, sometimes
angry, and often uncertain about courtroom decorum. In in-
stances where the need for tolerance and temperance is greatest,
it is the judge that should be the last person to lose composure.
That is not always the case.
The job of being a judge can be terribly isolating, particularly if
you recognize the need to keep an arms length relationship from
those who will appear before you. Isolation is not a preferable
state. Most people are social animals. Being a judge can lead to
loneliness, frustration, distrust, and depression. In some in-
stances, it's hard to maintain that arms length relationship. If a
judge is from a small town or county where everyone knows every-
one, attends the same social functions, sends kids to the same
schools, and see one another every day, the people who appear in
court are also people you interact with in those other roles.
The actual job of judging is hard. Rarely are matters black and
white. Issues are sometimes difficult and often require making
decisions about who to believe. The line between right and wrong
and truth or fiction, can be as narrow as a razor's edge. Every-
thing on either side of that narrow line is different shades of gray.
Judges are expected to exercise a kind of power they have never
experienced before. We certainly want our judges to be strong and
assured. We want them to control situations frequently filled with
highly charged emotions-even life and death. We also want them
to be compassionate but unyielding to the pressures of money and
influence. In short we want them to be independent and act inde-
pendently without overstepping the boundaries the rest of us set.
Our present systems of electing and appointing judges seems to
do little in ferreting out qualities that will assure us judges are
capable of demonstrating all these important characteristics. We
can articulate what we want a judge to be, but we can't identify
the qualities that will assure the judge will be able to fill those
shoes. Most people wouldn't think of turning the car keys over to
a kid who has a history of irresponsible behavior. Most would
likely agree that there is little to directly measure the "responsi-
bility" of judicial candidates except the normal vetting that goes
on: Do they pay their taxes? Do they hold jobs and perform well
in them? Do they contribute to the community? Do they have a
Fall 2010 919
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stable personal life? Do they care about the legal system and the
administration of justice? But it is also fair to expect men and
women to ascend to the bench who will likely be able to fill all the
responsibilities we impose on a judge. If we are able to elect or
appoint men and women with the traits necessary to make hard
decisions and withstand public pressure, we should not have to
concern ourselves with how they will use their independence judi-
ciary.
There is little in life that is really analogous to the role of being
a judge-even baseball umpires confer with one another before a
final ruling. Nor are there people without faults. People are sub-
ject to tempers and bad days. There are examples of individuals
who seem to be mediocre candidates for judicial office but who
prove to be outstanding jurists. People often can grow into the
role of being a judge. There are individuals with giant intellects
whom we put on the bench only to find them incapable of being
decisive, unable to meet deadlines or don't have the stomach to
maintain control over their courtroom. There are well known ex-
amples of people who undergo what appear to be radical changes
when they become judges. Some seemingly indecisive people be-
come firm and effective. Some people reinvent themselves. Cer-
tainly, Dwight Eisenhower did not anticipate that Earl Warren
would become the powerful progressive he was as chief justice.
27
Justices Brennan and Souter and to a lesser extent Sandra Day
O'Conner and Harry Blackman are recent examples of judges who
were perceived to undergo philosophical transformations after
they were appointed to the bench.28
Like it or not, judges no longer enjoy the protected and reflective
life thy once did. Not only is the work of a judge demanding, they
are expected to solve all matters of social problems. Disputes that
once were settled in homes, neighborhoods, families, and churches
are now resolved through lawsuits. Judges who seem removed
from the everyday life of the litigants are thought to be imperious,
out of touch, and ineffective. The truth is that people only want a
judge to be independent from the pressures or values coming from
the other side. When a judge is truly independent, people can be-
come suspicious.
Every person who interacts with judges has experienced "black
robe disease"; the condition affecting some judges who abuse their
27. See Jim NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AND THE NATION HE MADE
(2006).
28. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN (2005).
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power simply because they can. Those judges have little regard
for either lawyers or litigants who appear before them. Back robe
disease can manifest itself in laziness and the expectation that
they don't have to work any more simple because they are a judge.
Black robe disease can appear in a courtroom where a judge feels
it unnecessary to treat lawyers, witnesses or parties respectfully
and revels in belittling others.
The Luzerne County situation emphasizes the point that all of
the power, expectations, and demands on judges can go terribly
wrong. The situation also points out that both the integrity and
independence a judge is really a status that one earns; it is not an
entitlement. Like respect, it is something you have to work to-
ward every day. Simply put, we want our judges to earn and
maintain their independence by behaving in a responsible way.
Too often we put people on the bench hoping that they will un-
derstand the interplay between independence and responsibility
without either a measure of their ability to do so or a mechanism
to check it. And so a judge becomes misguided, a rogue, or at
worst a criminal. And the concept of judicial independence suffers
a mortal blow. No longer does the public want independence be-
cause its abuse has bred contempt. It is not fair to espouse inde-
pendence if the people who have been given it can't handle it. It is
only logical to expect the contempt and condemnation that un-
dermines the very principal we want society to expect.
Judicial independence often shields this behavior. The bad
judge's independence can protect not just the conduct that leads to
criminal or immoral acts, it can lead to conduct that can make life
miserable for people without ever becoming actionable. While the
reactions of the extremists in North Dakota were misguided, the
judiciary is capable of abuse of power that can understandably
anger the public.
Given the magnitude of ways that judges can squander their in-
dependence, more effort needs to be directed at making sure they
are doing the job expected of them. All of us hope we are on the
right path but in the absence of meaningful feedback we may nev-
er know for sure. The present system in Pennsylvania puts judges
on the bench with little in the way of qualifications. While expec-
tations for a judge are high, nothing measures whether those ex-
pectation are being met until a judge faces a retention election. At
that point, a judge can do an awful lot of damage.
Fall 2010 921
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V. EXISTING MECHANISMS TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL CONDUCT ARE
CUMBERSOME AND FOCUSED ON DISCIPLINARY MEASURES
When a judge strays from the responsibility expected of him or
her, the only present mechanism to address their misconduct is
judicial discipline or removal from the bench. Pennsylvania has,
by Constitutional Amendment created a Judicial Conduct Board
that is charged with the responsibility of disciplining judges who
are accused of wrongdoing. 29 The system is a reactive one; the
Board intervenes upon the filing of a complaint. Pennsylvania
does not require its judges to undergo mandatory legal education
as it does its lawyers. There is no required ethical training or
substantive law updates a judge must attend. What exactly con-
stitutes an actionable complaint against a judge is not clear.
There is no place to challenge a judge's ability to understand or
adhere to the law except through appeal. Even then, a judge who
is found to have abused his discretion or been wrong on the law is
not subject to any remedial process to address a misunderstanding
of his role or ignorance of the law. The Luzerne County incidents
have exposed weaknesses in the existing judicial disciplinary sys-
tem. It has come to light that a complaint made to the discipli-
nary board about the judges involved in the present scandal was
not acted on when the Board's counsel learned that the FBI had
opened a federal investigation. 3 0 As a result of this failure to in-
vestigate judicial conduct continued unchecked for months and
months while federal authorities assembled evidence sufficient to
justify criminal charges. Obviously, it does not take the same lev-
el of proof to remove, sanction, or suspend a judge whose conduct
appears improper while a formal investigation is undertaken.
In an extreme case a judge who misbehaves may be subject to
impeachment. 31 Impeachment was the mechanism employed to
remove Justice Rolf Larsen from the bench after he was accused of
a number of improper acts, including forging prescription medica-
tions for himself.32 Finally every judge is subject to a retention
election after ten years on the bench. There is, however, no stan-
dard by which a judge is evaluated nor any guidance given the
voter with respect to who should or shouldn't be retained. Some
29. PA. CONST. art. V, §18.
30. Leo Strupczewski & Hank Greziak, JCB Admits it Never Investigated Complaints
Against Conahan, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 2010, at 1.
31. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
32. In re Appeal of Rolf Larsen, 812 A.2d 640, 644-45 (2002).
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county bar associations undertake an evaluation process that they
offer to the public but there is little formal publication of the re-
sults of those evaluations. The circumstances in which a judge is
not successful at winning a retention election are few and far be-
tween.
There is legitimate reason that the removal of a judge is cum-
bersome and difficult. Judges should be immune from removal at
the will of the electorate or anyone else simply because of a disa-
greement over a judge's philosophy or a particular ruling in a par-
ticular case. The flipside of overinflating judicial independent is
undervaluing its importance. Irrespective of how vigilant the ju-
diciary has been to the demands of judicial independence, criti-
cism of how it is being employed and empowered does not trans-
late into weakening or abandoning it. The 2007 judicial retention
elections in Pennsylvania demonstrated the potential impact of a
misguided attack on the judiciary. Not only did that effort fail to
take into account the individual qualifications of sixty judges
throughout the state who deserved to be considered on the merits
of their work; it posed a substantial threat to the judicial system.
Because judicial elections only occur in odd numbered years, va-
cancies on the bench would have followed the removal of those
judges for at least twelve months unless the governor were able to
make interim appointments. To expect the governor to fill over
sixty vacancies without taking time to locate and consider quali-
fied candidates would be both unlikely and unreasonable. The
loss of that many would have a profound impact on the adminis-
tration of justice in Pennsylvania.
But too often judicial conduct which should result in some ac-
tion is unreported or not thought to be serious enough to rise to
the level of either formal discipline or removal. Judges can be di-
latory in their work habits, intemperate toward litigants, haughty,
highhanded, and imperious without triggering the presently exist-
ing intervention methods. Even if that conduct might justify de-
feating a judge at a retention election, to wait six, seven, or eight
years to address abuses of judicial power is not acceptable.
Judicial conduct that is unacceptable can also go unreported.
Lawyers who are aware of unacceptable behavior are often unwil-
ling to step forward. Although the disciplinary process is intended
to be confidential, the present system has no enforcement mechan-
ism for board appointments. The present system calls for the ap-
pointment of lawyers, judges, and lay people to the board. Unlike
the lawyers and judges there are no ramifications to a lay person
who discloses a complaint against an individual judge. Equally
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important is the fact that lawyers have little confidence that a
judge will not be able to conclude who has complained about them.
In rural counties with a small number of lawyers who appear in
court and only a few judges, the identity of the person who makes
a complaint can be pretty transparent. But even in the absence of
transparency or outright disclosure, the perception that exposure
will occur invokes widespread silence. Lawyers are like everyone
else in this regard. The many stories of grand jury leaks and re-
criminations by criminals against witnesses are enough to intimi-
date a lawyer who sees bad judicial conduct. While there is more
than sufficient reason to be concerned that public officials in Lu-
zerne County-the District Attorney and Public Defender in par-
ticular-saw nothing of concern, retaliation against them may
have kept them silent in the face of what seems to be obvious
abuses.
Discipline should not be the only response to judges who have
failed to perform appropriately. Long before a judge's conduct ris-
es to the level of reportable misconduct some mechanism for inter-
vention is needed. Judicial independence can impede that inter-
vention, though, if independence is a shield against any interfe-
rence from the outside with the actions of a judge. Obviously that
is not the intent of independence but it can be a consequence.
Judges are human beings who do not want to be scrutinized for
every misstep. Although high expectations for the office are war-
ranted, judges suffer from the same foibles the rest of us do.
Judges can procrastinate, become distracted, and, at times, be-
have badly. It is probable that fear of seeming just like the rest of
us is sometimes behind resistance to interference.
Most professionals experience some cause and effect between
their performance and their success. Even a doctor who treats
patients will experience a correlation between what they do and
the outcome. Rude and impolite treatment of patients will result
in the patient not coming back. Bad medicine leads to bad out-
comes and peer review reprisals or medical malpractice lawsuits.
But judges operate below this kind of scrutiny. Lawyers can't de-
cline to appear before a judge with whom they clash. Appeals
can't be based on the laziness of a judge or his ineffectiveness in
the courtroom. People in the ordinary workplace would not hold a
job long if they were dismissive, discourteous, lazy, or unproduc-
tive. Rarely are judges called on the carpet for the routine job per-
formance failures we all see.
It is important to acknowledge that judicial misbehavior is not
always the result of intentional or even negligent conduct. Judges
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are often unaware that their behavior is received as inappropriate
or abusive. Judges may not perceive they are being harsh or rude
when they speak or act.
Given the pressures and demands that judges experience, hu-
man weaknesses of mankind generally, and our changing society,
it is almost unrealistic to think that independence as we have
tried to promote it will ever be a stable state. Judges will do
things that they ought not do. People will react to judges in ways
they ought not react. It may, in reality, be vary hard in our cur-
rent climate to hold the principal of judicial independence in the
same regard it once was. Accountability of judges, in whatever
form that concept may take, is constantly pulling against inde-
pendence. It is time to look at the space between independence
and accountability and see if we can fill the void with a productive
mechanism for improving the appearance of misdirection that is
all too common.
VI. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS SUPPORT JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
In fact, there is a middle step that can accommodate the de-
mands of both. If a judge undergoes a balance analysis of his per-
formance on a periodic basis, there is an opportunity to ensure
that judges are performing their duties appropriately. Through a
judicial performance evaluation, a judge can hear constructive
criticism of the job he is doing with the hope that an evaluation
will improve his performance. 33 Eighteen states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico have taken steps which address the
problem of accountability by undertaking some form of judicial
evaluation process without invoking any threat to independence or
the risk of punishment or retaliation. 34 Each process is slightly
different than the other but New Hampshire may have adopted
the most progressive and balance system of all.3 5 Under a rule
adopted by the States Supreme Court, judges in that state under-
go judicial evaluations every three years. 36 Each judge is subject
to evaluation on specific areas of his or her performance in accor-
33. See Jordan M. Singer, Knowing is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective Per-
formance Evaluation s in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725 (2007).
34. UNIVERSITY OF DENVER'S INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES,
available at http://www.du.eduIlegalinstitute/JPE.pdf.
35. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56 (WNest, Westlaw through Nov. 2009 amendments).
36. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56 (MV(A).
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dance with set standards. Judges are reviewed on all aspects of a
judge's role. The evaluations are done by litigants, witnesses, ju-
rors, and lawyers. After the evaluations are accumulated they are
shared with the individual judge confidentially. The judge is pro-
vided with input on areas of deficiencies and problems. Each
judge is reevaluated again three years later. If prior deficiencies
continue and have not been adequately addressed by the judge
then the evaluations may become public documents. 37
The benefits of judicial evaluations should be obvious. First
they address the problems of isolation or a lack of self reflection.
They allow judge to become aware of perceived weakness without
fear of public embarrassment or retaliation. They not only en-
courage improvement, they promote respect for judicial indepen-
dence. Even through an evaluation is confidential, if the public is
aware of the fact that a judge is subject to this kind of review, they
are hard pressed to argue that judges are out of touch or acting on
their own without any guidelines. Attacks on the judiciary can be
reduced. Judicial evaluations counter the calls for extreme meas-
ures to sanction a judge who has rendered an unpopular decision
or even made a mistake.
One critical part of a judicial evaluation process is buy-in by the
judiciary. Judges must accept that there are limits to indepen-
dence and those limits are not theirs to set. While an independent
judiciary is critical to our democracy, so too are checks and bal-
ances. Too often the judiciary, in explaining why their indepen-
dence is so important, make it sound like they are above everyone
else. Whether that is true or not, an argument that they are ac-
countable to a different and amorphous standard doesn't sell well.
In addition, a larger, more diverse, more informed society has
created a different landscape than the one that existed a decade or
two ago. The public does not attend trials where they get to wit-
ness judges and lawyers in action. The press rarely sits through a
trial and rarely employs lawyers to observe. People witness a
form of vigilante justice on television and in the movies. In some
respect, what judges do and don't do is the product of second hand
information provided to a transparent society from the least
transparent branch of government. At the same time the legal
system has become a daily part of the life of society. Not only do
people not know their neighbor, even the slightest disagreement
ends up in court. Churches, schools, and community organiza-
37. N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56 (MVXB).
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tions are no longer community arbitrators. In fact they are as
likely to be litigants as anybody else. Legislatures churn out new
laws and the courts keep trying to adapt. Drug courts, treatment
courts, community courts, veteran courts, and a whole range of
other dispute resolution mechanisms have been put in play. The
pressure on the judiciary is extraordinary. The opportunity for
reflective thought, calm reasoning, and scholarly analysis has di-
minished. The result is the invariable outcome of familiarity:
contempt. Because we don't put premium value on the legal sys-
tem, we don't hold it in the high regard we once did. So as the
public demands more from the courts and they are unable to de-
liver, people get frustrated by the inability of the justice system to
fix everything that is wrong.
Judges cannot be expected to be flawless or to figure out the
bounds of independence on their own. Demanding respect to an
independent judiciary will not work in a vacuum or without some
give and take reflective of where we are as a country today. A
judicial evaluation process can provide a buffer to the critics on
both sides of the aisle.
Judges are like the legal system itself-resistant to change.
Some outspoken judges who do not like interference with their
autonomy will reject the notion of judicial evaluations as intru-
sive, untrustworthy and threatening to their independence. But
most judges should embrace the opportunity for healthy feedback
and guidance. Good judges have no fear of an evaluation process
because they know they are acting responsibly and an evaluation
will simply confirm that. Most of us deplored grades when we
were in school, except when we got high ones. When we got high
marks we were proud, reassured, and motivated. After school, we
rejoice in good performance evaluations in the work place or other
commendations for a job well done. When those acknowledge-
ments don't come or the performance evaluation is bad, we try
harder. In some instances we recognize we are in the wrong place
doing the wrong thing and we move on. But one way or another,
we want to know where we stand.
Whether a judicial evaluation process would have prevented the
corruption uncovered in Luzerne County is impossible to say.
Most people who commit criminal acts work diligently not to get
caught. The intent to deceive is the hallmark of corruption. But
one would like to think that a corrupt judge subject to wide rang-
ing scrutiny would have difficulty going unnoticed. Ten years a
very long time to go without any meaningful evaluation. There is
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little to be said to justify rejecting judicial performance evalua-
tions.
